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Pakistan is experiencing an unprecedented urban housing crisis. 
Low-rise, low-income urban settlements are rapidly and informally 
becoming high-rise, high-density informal settlements, with all 
the physical, social and environmental problems of unplanned 
densification. Meanwhile, speculative low-density elite housing 
is encroaching on the ecological assets of the city. This working 
paper explores the factors that have led to this crisis – and also 
what policy actions can be taken to help mitigate it, such as 
passing legislation to acquire land for low-income settlements, 
suppressing land speculation and prescribing minimum density 
for all settlements. Providing affordable credit and house 
improvement loans for informal settlements will also be crucial, as 
well as advice on how to use those loans effectively. Appropriate 
housing standards are also needed so that design and technical 
advice is available to those involved in the informal and formal 
densification process, while also establishing criteria for judging 
the merits of new housing projects. Finally, more research is 
needed to better understand the processes, actors and dynamics 
of the evolving informal densification process.
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Summary
Pakistan is experiencing an unprecedented urban 
housing crisis (Jahangir 2018). According to the 2017 
census its population of 207.7 million has grown by 2.4 
per cent per year in the intercensal period (Government 
of Pakistan 2017). Its urban population, on the other 
hand, has grown by 2.7 per cent per year during the 
same period and is now estimated at 75.5 million (ibid).
According to the census, urban housing demand in 
Pakistan is 350,000 units. Of this, 62 per cent is for 
lower-income groups, 25 per cent for lower middle-
income groups, and 10 per cent for higher and upper 
middle-income groups. The formal supply per year is 
150,000 units. The unmet demand is taken care of by 
two types of informal settlements: the occupation and 
subdivision of government land (katchi abadis) and 
the informal subdivision of agricultural land (ISALs) 
on the periphery of urban settlements. In the last two 
decades, however, the demand is increasingly being 
met by densification of existing low and lower middle-
income settlements.
Rural to urban migration is taking place on an 
unprecedented scale because of the demise of village 
self-sufficiency (the product of caste and a barter 
economy, which are in their last throes). At present, the 
state has no plans for dealing with the migrant influx. 
And it cannot provide them with homes. The option 
of living in katchi abadis or ISALs in the absence of 
available land near the ever-expanding urban centres 
is becoming difficult due to an increase in cost, 
distances and the inconvenience related to commuting. 
In response, low-rise low-income settlements near 
places of work or town centres are informally becoming 
high rise, with all the physical and social problems of 
unplanned densification. The units are also becoming 
smaller so as to become more affordable. Meanwhile, 
for the first time in Pakistan’s urban areas (especially in 
Karachi and the larger cities) people are sleeping under 
bridges, at roundabouts and pavements, and in open-
air ‘hotels’. 
The politician-developer nexus is producing gated 
communities for the elite and middle classes, 
segregating cities further into rich and poor areas, 
and thus increasing the possibility of urban conflict. 
Gentrification is taking public space and transferring 
it to the rich and middle classes, facilitated by large 
loans from international financial institutions leading to 
massive speculation which has put housing beyond the 
reach of even middle-class young couples. 
Provincial governments are promoting regularisation 
and improvement of informal settlements. However, 
in Karachi, through new legislation, they are also 
promoting their demolition and conversion into medium 
and high-rise apartments by developers. Supposedly, 
this will integrate these informal settlements into the 
city. But the finances for such large interventions are 
not available. Even if they were, this type of development 
would not be feasible for social and political reasons. 
What is required are house improvement loans for the 
katchi abadis and advice on how to use those loans 
effectively. Design and technical advice is desperately 
required by those involved in the informal densification 
process: individual families, neighbourhoods and 
informal developers and contractors. 
Yet credit facilities available to people living in low-
income informal settlements through banks and the 
House Building Finance Company Limited (HBFCL) 
cannot cover even a fraction of the demand. Without 
reform, the situation will not improve. If housing 
demand is to be better met, credit to purchase land 
for individuals or small cooperatives is required. To 
freeze the shelter shortage (backlog of 8.5 million units 
growing by 200,000 per year) 100 billion Pakistani 
rupees would be required annually for the next 10 years, 
whereas the 2017–18 national budget has allocated 
only 2.329 billion Pakistani rupees for housing.
The state is already transferring some of its 
responsibilities to companies, such as the collection 
of revenue. But this policy requires a strong regulatory 
framework to protect the poorer sections of the 
population. For example, they cannot afford to pay 
their energy bills since the costs are exorbitant. With 
solid waste management, the katchi abadis have been 
ignored. And unlike 15 years ago, a family must now pay 
to enter a recreational park or to park their motorbike 
or car, while heavy road tolls make private travel 
prohibitively expensive. 
The state now ignores protests from communities who 
increasingly use NGOs or political parties as go-
betweens for negotiations. The resulting culture has, 
apart from creating dependence, distanced government 
agencies from communities. The state does listen 
to those community projects which it showcases. 
But these are becoming increasingly rare due to 
capitalist domination.
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Without land-use planning or implementation, expanding 
urban centres are swallowing valuable agricultural land 
and damaging the ecology where the cities are located. 
This is causing flooding and a rise in temperature, 
creating heat island effects in urban areas especially in 
the high-density high-rise informal settlements. 
If unchecked these environmental hazards will increase. 
New building design and technology is needed. It 
must be affordable for low-income groups (especially 
insulation of external walls and roofs and planting trees) 
to deal with the effects of climate change. Urbanisation 
on the periphery is also destroying traditional cultural 
precincts, intangible cultures and archaeological sites. 
With the neoliberal regime and its emphasis on direct 
foreign investment, master and strategic planning 
has been replaced by unrelated projects for which 
funds are available in the international market and with 
international financial institutions.
If we accept this situation as ongoing, then we need 
criteria for judging future settlement projects. The Urban 
Resource Centre (URC) in Karachi has developed 
the following: 
• Projects should not destroy the ecology of the region 
in which the city is located,
• Projects should prioritise the interests of the lower-
income and lower middle-income groups who form 
the vast majority of the populations of urban centres,
• Land use should be decided on social and 
environmental considerations and not land value 
alone, and
• Projects should not damage the tangible and 
intangible culture of the communities that live in urban 
areas.
However, the most important issue is related to land, its 
use and conservation. The URC in Karachi believes that 
Pakistan requires serious urban land reform, including 
the following key elements:
• A heavy non-utilisation fee on land and property.
• An urban land ceiling act whereby no one person can 
own more than 500m3 of urban land.
• No settlement should have a density of less than 400 
persons per hectare.
• No person who has already taken out a loan for house 
building should be given another loan. 
Powerful developers’ lobby and elite interests make it 
difficult to implement such an urban land reform. But the 
political scenario in Pakistan is changing and given the 
recent activism of the higher courts, such a conversation 
can take place.
These recommendations will need time and effort. 
More importantly, for the foreseeable future, housing 
will increasingly be provided by the formal and informal 
private sectors. ‘Formal’ because increasingly funds 
are being made available for it – and ‘informal’ because 
there is both demand and huge profits to be made 
with very little investment. But intervention is needed. 
Both formal and informal housing products must be 
better designed and more affordable. Legislation is 
needed whereby the state can acquire vacant land for 
low-income housing and develop appropriately located 
road infrastructure.
Academic institutions promote community housing 
projects. This is important. But to make relevant 
interventions, they must also understand formal and 
informal capitalist modes of housing production, 
its potential and its constraints in different Pakistan 
contexts – taking into account density, space per 
person, energy and their relationship with architecture 
and planning. 
There are many peasant and indigenous peoples’ 
movements against the urbanisation of agricultural 
land, water resources, cultural sites and orchards. They 
need the support of academic institutions and civil 
society – and many related issues are already before a 
supposedly pro-poor and involved Supreme Court. If 
these movements are strengthened – with research and 
advocacy support from academic institutions and civil 
society – then the political establishment and the courts 
of law, especially the environmental tribunals, will take 
note of it. 
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1 
Pakistan’s urban crisis 
in context
The State shall provide basic necessities of 
life, such as food, clothing, housing, education 
and medical relief, for all such citizens, 
irrespective of sex, caste, creed or race, as 
are permanently or temporarily unable to earn 
their livelihood on account of infirmity, sickness 
or unemployment
Government of Pakistan (1973)
1.1 Pakistan’s population
Pakistan is a federation of four provinces located 
in South Asia and bordered by Afghanistan, China, 
India and Iran. Its coastline lies along the Arabian Sea 
and the Gulf of Oman. The provinces that make up 
the country are Sindh, Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
(formerly known as North West Frontier Province) 
and Balochistan. 
Pakistan came into existence as a result of the 
partition of British India in 1947. The country has 
an elected national assembly, which is the lower 
house of parliament, and a senate, which constitutes 
the upper house. In addition, each province has an 
elected provincial assembly. The local government at 
the district level has mostly been subservient to the 
provincial bureaucracy. 
Pakistan contains 2.3 per cent of the world’s population. 
It is the seventh most populous country in the world. 
According to the 1998 census, its population was 132.4 
million and had grown at the rate of 2.6 per cent per 
year in the intercensal period. Its urban population, on 
the other hand, had grown at the rate of 3.5 per cent per 
year during the same period and was estimated at 43 
million (Hasan 2006a). 
Pakistan’s urban and rural populations at the last census 
before independence (conducted in 1941) were 4 
million and 24.2 million respectively. At present, the 
urban and rural populations have increased to 75.58 
million and 132.18 million respectively as per the 2017 
census (ibid). 
Demographers have questioned these figures, 
especially in relation to the urban population which 
they feel has been understated. This understatement 
is related to three factors. For the 1981 and 1998 
censuses the definition of ‘urban’ was changed to mean 
only those human settlements which had municipal 
governments. In the earlier definition, settlements with 
a population of 5,000 and above which had urban 
characteristics could be considered as urban (ibid). 
1.2 Urban expansion in 
Pakistan: background
As a result of the partition of India and the creation of 
Pakistan, there was an exchange of populations. Seven 
million Muslims from India migrated to Pakistan and 
about 6 million Hindus and Sikhs migrated to India from 
Pakistan. All of this happened within three months. As 
a result of this migration, the population of many towns 
in Punjab and Sindh increased by well over 50 per cent 
and in the case of Karachi by over 100 per cent (ibid). 
The government faced an immense housing crisis. 
This was brought to light by the 1951 census which 
recorded over 48 per cent of urban Pakistanis saying 
that they had migrated from India. 
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Initially, the refugees invaded all open public spaces. 
They were removed from most of these and settled into 
what were known as displaced peoples’ colonies. To 
facilitate the provision of services to these colonies, 
organisations known as improvement trusts were 
created such as the Karachi Improvement Trust or the 
Lahore Improvement Trust. These were managed by the 
provincial bureaucracy in a very top-down manner. Many 
of these colonies became permanent settlements with 
the people acquiring tenure rights. 
In the early 1950s, the government initiated the 
building of core houses for the refugee populations. 
In the case of Karachi, the programme was very 
ambitious and sought to build 40,000 houses in the 
first phase. However, due to financial and administrative 
reasons and the lack of capability and capacity in 
the implementing agencies, the programme was 
abandoned after building only 10,000 housing units. 
Following this failure, the government developed plot 
townships where it provided a plot, water by tanker 
trucks, a service road, and left the house-building and 
service-acquiring processes to the residents (Hasan 
2000a). These townships were also on too small a 
scale to meet the demand and with internal migration 
increasing rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s, the demand 
increased phenomenally. 
To meet this demand, two informal processes emerged 
through which the majority of urban Pakistanis have 
acquired their homes. One is the informal subdivision of 
government land (ISDs) (see Box 1). The second is the 
informal subdivision of agricultural land (ISAL) on the 
city periphery (see Box 2). 
1 Karachi is the capital of the province of Sindh and is the most populous city in Pakistan. It contains 9 per cent of Pakistan’s total population and 24 per cent 
of the country’s urban population. It generates 15 per cent of national GDP, 25 per cent of the country’s revenues, and 62 per cent of income tax. It is also 
Pakistan’s media centre, economic hub, and the country’s only port (City District Government Karachi 2007)
Box 1. The evoLuTion of YAkooBABAd iSAL
Yakoobabad is an informal settlement in Orangi Town, 
Karachi.1 Before 1977, it was vacant land belonging 
to the Board of Revenue (BOR) who had given it on 
a one-year renewable lease as pasture land to an 
elder of the Rind tribe (henceforth referred to as X). 
In February 1977, Y, who is a well-known informal 
developer, moved onto X’s land with 100 destitute 
families whom he provided with bamboo posts and 
mats for constructing shacks. 
X resisted the occupation and there was violence. 
The local police station intervened and arbitrated. It 
was decided that the Rind tribe would receive 500 
Pakistani rupees for every plot that was developed by 
Y. The plots given to the 100 destitute people were 
exempt from payment and Y also did not receive any 
payments for them. It was also agreed that Y would 
pay 200 Pakistani rupees per plot to the Karachi 
Metropolitan Corporation (KMC) officials from the 
sale proceeds. Then the police would recover 200 
Pakistani rupees or more from the owners who had 
converted their shacks into concrete constructions.
After this, Y laid out Yakoobabad on a grid plan, 
leveled the roads by informally hiring tractors and 
a bulldozer from the KMC staff and left an open 
space for a mosque and school. Commercial plots 
were set aside for speculation along the main roads. 
Negotiations were entered into with representatives 
and touts of government officials who could be of help 
in the future development of the settlement. Thirty 
per cent of all plots were set aside for these officials 
for speculation purposes. Whoever purchased a 
plot, except the KMC and government officials, had 
to construct and occupy the house within a month, 
failing which s/he would lose the plot and the money 
they had paid for it. Thus, speculation was prevented 
and the settlement expanded quickly. 
Y engaged donkey-cart owners to supply water 
(illegally acquired from the KMC water mains in 
Orangi) which was paid for by the residents. A few 
weeks after the first shack was built, a contractor, 
Nawab Ali, established a building-component 
manufacturing yard in the settlement and started 
supplying concrete blocks and tin roof sheets along 
with technical advice and small credit for house 
building. By 2000, 92 per cent of the families had built 
their homes with support from Nawab Ali and 62 per 
cent had taken credit from him. Another entrepreneur, 
Faiz Muhammad Baloch, moved into the area, set up 
a generator and started supplying electricity to the 
residents at the rate of 30 Pakistani rupees (payable 
in advance) per month for a 40-watt bulb. 
Y formed and registered a welfare association 
of all the households who purchased a plot from 
him. Through the association, he has lobbied for 
infrastructure and improvements with the help of 
officials and politicians who held plots in Yakoobabad. 
As a result, by 2000, Yakoobabad had become a 
proper settlement with electricity, telephone lines, 
water and gas connections. Also by 2000, the area 
had 10 primary schools, two secondary schools, 
six clinics and paved roads including 401 micro-
enterprise units providing employment to over 2,600 
people in the settlement.
Source: Hasan (2000b)
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Box 2. The infoRmAL deveLoPeRS of fAiSALABAd iSAL
Chaudhary Ghulam Rasool Cheema is an informal 
developer in Faisalabad.2 His family came from 
Gurdaspur in India and lived near a village on 
Jaranwala Road. His first job was as a storekeeper 
for the Water and Power Development Authority 
(WAPDA). He began his business as a developer 
because his salary could not support his large family. 
To begin with, he sold a piece of land in his village, 
about 20 kilometres from Faisalabad. He chose to 
work along the Jaranwala Road because the people 
of the area knew of him through his political activities 
(Cheema was a member of the Pakistan People’s 
Party and later of the Pakistan Muslim League). He 
planned his first housing scheme in 1990 but work 
on it started in 1994. Now, he has completed five 
small schemes, each with 70 to 150 plots. Plots are 
usually 5 marla measuring 30 by 45 feet.3 The streets 
are 20 to 28 feet wide. He raises the streets two feet 
above the road level. If the streets are not raised, then 
people will not buy the plots because they are afraid 
of flooding. The earthworks for the streets is done by 
Afghanis who use trolleys and jackhammers for this 
job. Local people do not do this work since they lack 
the experience or tools. 
The planning of the scheme is done by Mr Cheema 
himself, after which the sketches are provided to a 
draftsman for further development. His draftsmen are 
Faisalabad Development Authority (FDA) employees 
and are hired by him on a per job basis. In his 
business, Cheema employs two persons as office 
staff. However, he also hires a number of fieldworkers, 
who contact prospective clients, prepare the layout 
on site and supervise the earthworks. When a 
project begins, he usually has about 20 fieldworkers 
who provide forms to the clients at 10 Pakistani 
rupees. If they sell ten forms in a day, they earn 100 
Pakistani rupees.4 
For the advertisement of a scheme, a pamphlet is 
prepared and published in newspapers inviting young 
middle or metric educated boys to come and work as 
field staff. These boys visit areas which are congested 
or where people do not have their own houses. The 
fieldworkers brief them about the scheme and try to 
convince them that they should buy a plot. Most of 
the boys who respond to Mr Cheema’s advertisement 
already have experience in this field. They are given 
a further incentive of a commission for each plot that 
they sell. 
The most important criteria for the purchase of land 
for the scheme is the availability of transport (access 
to the main intercity road) and electricity. If the land 
is more than 2km from the intercity road, the scheme 
will not sell. There is no attempt to develop corner 
plots or commercial plots, only 5 marla subdivisions. 
In smaller schemes, Mr Cheema provides no services 
such as water, sewage or electricity. Instead, people 
acquire water by hand pumps (which they later 
convert to piston pumps), self-made sewerage 
(invariably disposing it into a canal) and electricity by 
lobbying WAPDA. 
The developer does not retain plots for speculation 
but 30 per cent of them normally remain unsold for 
three to four years. There is a written agreement 
with the person who purchases the plot and 
proper records of receipts of installments paid 
are maintained. People invariably pay regularly by 
coming themselves to Mr Cheema’s office. For the 
transfer of land from the landowner to Mr Cheema, 
both parties visit the divisional headquarters where 
land records are kept. Here they pay legal as well as 
‘other’ charges. In the revenue department ledger, 
land remains as agricultural and streets and roads are 
recorded as amenities. The cost of transfer of land to 
the developer is borne by the purchaser. 
When Mr Cheema started his business in 1990, 
he had to seek out people who wanted to sell their 
agricultural land. Now that people know that he is in 
business and has an office where plans are displayed, 
landowners come to him themselves. Also, wherever 
he develops a scheme, he puts up a board on which 
the name, plan and details of the scheme are given. 
Mr Cheema says that the success of these schemes 
lies in the fact that the developers have understood 
what a poor man can afford to pay and they act 
accordingly. He also says that if the government could 
support this activity and provide the developers with 
loans, then in two to three years’ time there would be 
nobody in Faisalabad who was still homeless. 
Source: Observations and interviews by the lead author.
2 Faisalabad is arguably the most important secondary city of Pakistan. It is the centre of the country’s textile industry. In 1941 it had a population of 69,930 
and in the 1998 census it had a population of 2,009,000 (AUICK 2004). It is expanding rapidly through ISALs and as an important academic centre for the 
Punjab province.
3 A marla is a traditional unit of area used in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh.
4 In Pakistan, the minimum wage is 18,000 Pakistani rupees a month. But for the unemployed youth, this small amount money earnt is still an attractive bonus.
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The informal subdivision of agricultural land is a very 
different phenomenon from informal subdivisions of 
state land. The ISDs came to be known as katchi 
abadis whereas ISALs came to be known as slums in 
official documents. ISALs, though informally developed, 
have tenure security which the katchi abadis do not 
(see Table 1). 
According to Faisalabad Development Authority 
(FDA) estimates, informal developers are subdividing 
agricultural land for housing on a large scale (2,000–
2,500 plots per year) to meet the housing demand 
which is estimated at 7,000 units for low-income 
groups. There is no housing scheme in the public 
sector and one of the reasons for this is that the FDA 
does not own any more land. In addition, there is no 
plan to integrate the informal housing projects into a 
larger city plan. Of the schemes that the informal sector 
develops, not even 10 per cent are approved by the 
FDA and in many cases, the FDA has no full information 
of them. 
Between 1947 and 1998, Faisalabad’s population 
increased by about 1.9 million. A minimum of 200,000 
housing units would be required for this population 
increase. However, between 1947 and 1998, the 
government was only able to provide 38,785 plots 
and houses. This includes nuclear houses and 22 flats 
developed for the residents of bulldozed katchi abadis 
(Aleemuddin et al. undated). 
Table 1. Comparison of ISDs and ISALs
infoRmAL SuBdiviSion of goveRnmenT 
LAnd (iSd)
infoRmAL SuBdiviSion of AgRicuLTuRAL 
LAnd (iSAL) 
On government land On private agricultural land
A diminishing phenomena (mainly in Sindh) Increasing rapidly across Pakistan
A government official-middleman joint venture (often 
politicians involved)
A middleman-landowner joint venture facilitated 
informally by government officials
Middleman overheads are bribes and bhatta Middleman overheads are minimal
Speculation is controlled by forcing occupation of land Speculation is not controlled and so parts of schemes 
may remain vacant for years
Initially no security of tenure Security of tenure
Large schemes in Sindh (Karachi) Small schemes (average of 60 plots)
Large plots, proper roads, amenities Increasingly smaller plots, narrow roads, no amenities 
Located wherever there is accessible government land Located in 0.5 to 1km widths along existing corridors in 
urban areas
One-time payment for land to middleman but bhatta is 
paid till the settlement is secure
Payments made in instalments for land to the 
middleman – no bhatta 
Strong middleman-backed community organisations 
for acquiring tenure rights and infrastructure (which is 
seen to add to tenure security)
Community-based organisations (CBOs) formed by 
public-spirited individuals/groups, but there are few 
CBOs
Government inputs: the Katchi Abadi Improvement 
Programme (KIP) 
Government inputs: MNAs/MPAs/councillor ad-hoc 
schemes
Purely poor communities Poor communities and for middle-income groups
Informal cooperatives 
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1.3 Pakistan’s housing 
situation
The current housing situation and trends are given 
below. The number of housing units between 1980 and 
1998 increased by 2.47 million, which is an increase 
of almost 70 per cent. Persons per room declined from 
3.2 to 2.6. One-room houses decreased from 42.58 per 
cent to 30.38 per cent and 2–4 room houses increased 
from 13.68 per cent to 19.11 per cent. This shows an 
overall improvement of the housing conditions in the 
country. However, there are major provincial differences 
between the provinces. In Balochistan, for instance, 
persons per housing unit increased from 7.6 to 7.8 
and in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to 7.9 while the national 
average stood at 7, with Sindh having the lowest at 6.8 
(Government of Pakistan 2017). The current housing 
demand and supply is given in Table 2.
About 25 per cent of the unmet urban demand is 
accommodated by the creation of katchi abadis, 60 
per cent through ISALs and 15 per cent through the 
densification of inner cities (Jabeen et al. undated). 
In addition, there is a total annual housing backlog of 
around 605,000 of which about 50 per cent is urban.5 
As a result, the katchi abadis and ISALs keep growing 
(see Table 3 for Karachi). 
1.4 The improvement and 
regularisation programme
In the 1970s election, the Pakistan Peoples Party 
(PPP) with its socialist agenda came to power and 
initiated the ‘malikana huqooq’ or ownership rights 
programme whereby it sought to regularise and improve 
katchi abadis on government land. However, a proper 
law, the Katchi Abadi Improvement Programme (KIP) 
was enacted only in 1978 giving the provinces the 
right to legislate on the regularisation processes and 
institutional arrangements. 
Initially, local governments at the district and sub-district 
levels were given powers for this process and they 
created katachi abadi directorates. However, these local 
governments in Sindh and Punjab, where most katchi 
Table 2. Current housing demand and supply
Total demand per year 700,000 units
Urban demand per year 350,000 units
Rural demand per year 350,000 units
Lower-income group 62%
Lower middle-income group 25%
Higher/upper middle-income group 10%
Formal supply per year 250,000 units
Urban supply per year 150,000 units
Rural supply per year 100,000 units
Source: Jabeen et al. (undated)
Table 3. Karachi’s katchi abadi population
1978 1985 1998 2006
Population 2,000,000 2,600,000 4,901,067 8,540,000
Number of households 227,000 356,000 700,152 1,200,000
% population 55% 43% 50% 61%
5 Calculated by the authors using government figures and reports.
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abadis were located, were subservient to the provincial 
bureaucracy. The urban development authorities also 
became one of the regulating authorities/institutions. 
For example, under the provincial government the 
Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (SKAA) was created for 
this purpose. As such, elected local bodies were not 
directly involved in the regularisation process. Over 
time, through election promises and their fulfilment, the 
majority of katchi abadis in Pakistan had been notified 
for regularisation and in the case of Karachi, 72 per cent 
have been notified.
The Junejo government in 1987 announced 23 March 
1985 as the cut-off date for the regularisation of katchi 
abadis in Sindh. However, because of a number of 
administrative and legal issues related to the transfer of 
land process, regularisation was delayed. Meanwhile 
new katchi abadis were created. As a result, the cut-off 
date was later extended to 30 June 1997 and in the 
Punjab to 31 December 2011. The cut-off date means 
very little because it does not prevent the katchi abadis 
from densifying upwards and often encroaching on 
adjacent land if it is available.
Unlike the katchi abadis, ISALs have not been the 
beneficiaries of a national programme. Their acquiring 
of amenities and upgrading has been carried out by 
Members of the National Assembly (MNAs), Members 
of the Provincial Assembly (MPAs), councillor funds 
and local government projects. As long as the local 
governments were empowered between 2001–2008, 
considerable funds were used for providing water, 
drainage and street paving to the ISAL settlements. 
However, since then, provincial governments have not 
provided their local governments with sufficient funds to 
continue with this work as before (Rashid 2018). 
1.5 The regularisation 
process 
The regularisation process involves much paperwork 
on the part of the house owner and visits to a number 
of offices. As a result, even despite improvements 
in the katchi abadis a very small number of people 
have actually acquired leases. The notification of 
regularisation of a katchi abadi provides de-facto 
ownership to the residents. The paperwork also 
involves drafting plans for a house, including areas and 
dimensions. Since this is beyond the capability of most 
house owners, middlemen have emerged who prepare 
the documentation required for the lease and undertake 
to obtain the necessary lease document as well. This is 
done for a considerable fee. 
14     www.iied.org
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2 
Pakistan’s current 
housing policy
The current housing policy officially in use was framed 
in 2001. It dealt with a number of issues. It gave priority 
to the identification of land for housing by provincial 
and local authorities and removing bottlenecks from 
the land-acquisition process. It emphasised resource 
mobilisation and encouraged institutions to provide 
mortgage loans for housing at market rates. In addition, 
it proposed a housing refinance window at the State 
Bank of Pakistan for long-term multilateral agencies 
such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) and the Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA). Further, it also gave incentives to the 
construction services sector to build for low-income 
and lower middle-income clients and proposed further 
regularisation for the katchi abadis and the slums 
through resettlement plans, emphasising that no eviction 
shall take place from slums and katchi abadis unless 
residents are relocated. The necessity of research on 
the building materials and construction technology 
required to respond to the housing crisis was also 
identified. An important section of the report deals 
with women in housing and community participation 
and emphasises the need for women to be a part of 
the decision-making process in housing-related fields 
(Ministry of Housing and Works 2001). 
Although political parties have promised much (see 
Box 3) very little of the policy recommendations have 
been followed except for support to the builders in 
terms of accessing loans, reducing taxes on them, and 
increasing the number of katchi abadis for regularisation 
purposes. The other important recommendations 
on housing finance have been implemented and the 
process of acquiring loans has been considerably 
liberalised. As a result, many banks are today providing 
mortgage finance. The policy also recommends that 
provincial governments initiate legislative measures 
encouraging even the smallest administrative 
units to effectively implement the policy. The lower 
middle-income groups are the main beneficiaries of 
these policies.
Despite liberalising the availability of mortgage loans, 
the poor are still not beneficiaries simply because no 
loans are available for the purchase of land. To add 
to this, loans for house building require a collateral 
or a formal-sector job, neither of which the poor have 
(72 per cent of all jobs in Pakistan are informal). The 
high interest rates on these loans also make them 
unaffordable to these poorer populations. However, 
in theory, banks have now started to accept a 
leased katchi abadi house as collateral for funding 
house improvement. 
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Pakistan 
adopted neoliberal policies for its economic and 
housing sectors. As a result, families have to simply 
access the market which is dominated by developers 
in the big cities. The developers acquire land from 
private owners or from government planned schemes 
and get loans approved for their clients from the House 
Building Finance Company (HBFCL) thus making their 
product more affordable. Large developers such as the 
Defence Housing Authority (DHA) (see Box 4) develop 
land (which they acquire from the state) into huge 
townships and sell it for commercial and residential use. 
More recently, developers have also started to cater 
to the lower-middle classes. But to make the product 
affordable, the units created are far too small for a family 
of five to live comfortably. Residents feel that their katchi 
abadis were friendlier in social and climatic terms. 
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These developers and their clients have extremely bad 
relationships. Clients accuse the developers of cheating 
and bullying them. As a result, clients usually form 
associations which eventually take over the maintenance 
of the housing complexes. The developers and DHA 
mostly develop sites and services for high- and middle-
income groups in gated settlements. These schemes 
are not created in response to a housing need: they are 
created because they are highly profitable. 
Alot of property is being built exclusively for profit. 
There is a huge speculative market and there are 
properties all over Pakistan that have been vacant for 
over two decades or even more. In the case of Karachi, 
there are over 300,000 plots lying vacant and 68,000 
apartments. It is also estimated that there are over 
200,000 apartments under construction in high-rise 
buildings of 12–40 storeys in the city. Most of these 
are on the immediate fringe of the city, most in gated 
settlements, and almost all housing schemes have the 
support of the HBFCL (Khan 2018). The citizens prefer 
gated communities because of the security situation 
in Karachi which is the result of the Afghan war and 
Karachi’s association with it. The larger developers 
Box 3. unfuLfiLLed PRomiSeS: incomPLeTe houSing 
SchemeS
In 2008, the PPP announced a project under which 
the poor would be provided with affordable homes 
and plots in all cities of Sindh including Karachi. 
This project, to be commenced under the Shaheed 
Benazir Bhutto Housing Cell, was to cater to around 
15,000 underprivileged families. The former chief 
minister, Qaim Ali Shah had approved the allocation of 
350 acres of land in different parts of Karachi for this 
project. However, the land was never transferred to 
the Shaheed Benazir Bhutto Housing Cell. The land 
utilisation department under the new administration 
of the housing cell issued challans (official payment 
receipts) worth 170 million Pakistani rupees to 
transfer ownership of the land to the housing cell in 
June 2016. The release of the payment was delayed 
and so was the transfer of the land. There have been 
several problems as a result: 
• Because of the delays, land near Surjani Town has 
now been illegally occupied. There are fears that the 
rest of the land is also being encroached upon. 
• In Hyderabad, 4.6 million Pakistani rupees were to 
be provided to the land utilisation department so 
that it could obtain ownership of land for a project 
to provide 300 families with plots at low rates on a 
total of 19 acres. But this is yet to happen. 
• In Mirpurkhas, 12 acres of land has been allocated 
for 200 families, and 5 acres has been allocated 
for 120 families in Nawabshah. But no work has 
commenced on either project. Instead, the projects 
have suffered from reports of financial irregularities 
and a lack of administration. 
• All of this – in Mirpurkhas, Nawabshah, Surjani and 
Hyderabad – resulted in the National Accountability 
Bureau (NAB) arresting the former chairperson and 
technical director of the cell, Manzar Abbas, along 
with several other employees in 2015.
In 2013, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) party 
led by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced the 
Apna Ghar Housing Scheme. But the project has 
yielded nothing so far except for files. 
• The Party’s manifesto promised to provide at least 
1,000 clusters of 500 houses each. The provinces 
were to provide the land free of charge and the 
construction costs would be taken up by the federal 
government. This project was to be completed 
within five years. 
• However, of the 350 million Pakistani rupees 
asked for by the Housing Ministry, the government 
allocated only 10 million Pakistani rupees. 
• The project also had no permanent chief executive 
or related staff to run the programme and continued 
to be a low priority for the government throughout 
its term. 
Imran Khan of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) 
party has announced that in the next five years his 
government will provide 5 million new housing units. 
However, his government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
was the fourth provincial government to have failed 
to complete the Regi Model Town launched 26 years 
ago. The Peshawar Development Authority (PDA) has 
been accused of spending the funds for Regi Model 
Town on other projects. 
• Regi Model Town has 26,000 plots and is the 
oldest and largest housing project in the province. 
But out of five proposed zones, in Zones 3 and 4 
the PTI government has failed to develop 10,000 
housing units. Only 600 houses have been built and 
a few dozen are under construction. 
• There are no facilities available to the residents 
except for electricity and water. The residents were 
promised gas connections three years ago but 
these have also yet to be provided.
Sources: Haq (2016); Abro (2017); Mushtaq (2018); Shaheed 
Benazir Bhutto Housing Cell. 
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are very close to politicians and have a number of joint 
ventures with them. They also invest in the elections 
for national and provincial assemblies, backing those 
candidates they think would be of use to them if they 
came to power. One such developer is Bahria Town 
(see Box 5).
Bahria Town Karachi (BTK) and DHA both coerce 
landowners on the periphery of the city to surrender 
their land to them with the help of the police. Since very 
little land in sufficiently large plots is available within the 
cities many of the townships being developed by the 
developers are beyond the peripheries of these cities, 
causing serious ecological damage to the peripheries of 
big cities in Pakistan (see Box 6). 
Box 4. defence houSing AuThoRiTY (dhA) ToWnShiPS 
The Defence Housing Authority Karachi was initially 
called the Pakistan Defence Officers’ Cooperative 
Housing Society (PDOCHS) and was developed 
under the 1860 Societies Registration Act. It is the 
largest cooperative society, owning about 7,000 acres 
of land or 5 per cent of the city area. 
At the end of the 1970s, development was 
proceeding slowly and the society’s financial situation 
was deteriorating. To avert a crisis, the then military 
dictator of Pakistan, General Zia-ul-Haq, dissolved 
PDOCHS and formed the DHA as an autonomous 
new authority with extensive development rights. 
Clifton Cantonment was established as a part of this 
process, with the express purpose and mandate of 
looking after and maintaining the DHA. 
The DHA now has its own development plans, 
strategies and by-laws, and is not bound to 
follow development decisions made by the city 
administration. Like other cantonments, it can 
share, consult with and receive advice from the city 
government regarding development decisions, but is 
not bound to follow its advice. All of the lands DHA 
holds is located in prime sites. 
It recently acquired an additional 5,080 hectares of 
land to develop a DHA city on the city fringe. Through 
the power of the army, the DHA and its affiliated 
cantonments have become major players in land 
politics, leading to land and property speculation for 
and by the elite. 
The DHA exists in all of the major cities of Pakistan 
and is now establishing itself even in the secondary 
cities. There are serious accusations against it of 
acquiring rural land and villages through coercion and 
use of its power base. 
Sources: Hasan et al. (2015); Ezdi (undated).
Box 5. BAhRiA ToWn kARAchi (BTk)
Bahria Town is a privately owned real-estate 
development company based in Rawalpindi. The 
company was founded in the late 1990s and has been 
developing gated communities ever since. Currently, 
it has developed six: Bahria Town Rawalpindi, Bahria 
Town Islamabad, Bahria Town Lahore, Bahria Town 
Karachi, Bahria Town Nawabshah, and Bahria 
Golf City. 
Bahria Town Karachi (BTK) is the largest of these. 
Spread over 16,000 hectares (40,000 acres) it is 
estimated to house around 1 million people and the 
total cost of the project is a little over US$1 billion. 
This land has been acquired through political 
patronage and much of it was owned for centuries 
by villagers. Most of them were herdsmen and 
this land was their pastureland. BTK has coerced 
these villagers (residing in almost 45 villages) into 
abandoning their properties through encroachment, 
threats, arrests, harassment and the bulldozing of 
their settlements. All this has been done with the 
support of the police. Apart from bulldozing poor 
settlements, BTK has also bulldozed many historical 
sites such as shrines, temples and a Buddhist stupa 
(an archaeological site) present within the vicinity. 
BTK’s development also encroaches upon the water 
supply to Karachi. The evictions are creating a new 
housing problem and the project is the cause of a 
major ecological disaster (see also Box 6). 
The project was largely done with support of the Malir 
Development Authority (MDA), which manipulated 
its laws by passing amendments that violate other 
sections of the law, such as the Disposal of Plots 
Rules 2006 framed under the MDA Act. Section 17 of 
the Colonization Act of 1912 has also been violated. 
The Supreme Court has recently taken notice of 
this, formed a committee and stopped the transfer 
of properties. 
Sources: Zaman and Ali (2016); The News International (2014); 
Shaheen (2016); Bhatti (2018).
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The rapid and exponential growth in the housing 
market over the last three decades has pushed house-
ownership beyond the reach of middle-class couples. 
However, the Supreme Court’s recent ruling on BTK 
barring it from selling or allotting land after declaring that 
the land was acquired illegally seems to suggest that 
the market is moving towards some structural change 
(Subohi 2018, Bhatti 2018). 
2.1 Financial policies
There are severe budgetary constraints at the federal 
and provincial levels as miniscule allocations are made 
for housing needs (see Table 4).
These allocations are insignificant in comparison to 
an estimated minimum outlay of 100 billion Pakistani 
rupees per year needed for the next 10 years to freeze 
shelter shortages at present levels (8.5 million low-cost 
housing units growing at 200,000 units per annum due 
to rapid urbanisation and lack of supply) (Said 2016). 
It has been established that the minimum amount 
required to build a house for a poor family is 500,000 
Pakistani rupees (US$5,556 at current exchange 
rates). A family that earns 15,000 Pakistani rupees 
(US$166) per month should not pay more than 5,000 
Pakistani rupees a month to repay this amount over 15 
years. The most important requirement for low-income 
groups is funding to buy a plot of land in a formal-sector 
Box 6. ecoLogicAL dAmAge in kARAchi And muLTAn
The construction of elite gated communities and 
informal settlements is causing much ecological 
damage in and around the cities of Karachi and 
Multan. Similar damage is being caused to all cities 
where population pressure is increasing. 
Karachi faces these repercussions in the form of 
floods. These occur not because of climate change, 
but because of encroachment on the outfalls to the 
sea by elite housing projects and land reclamation for 
informal settlements. The reclamation from mangroves 
(about 15,000 hectares in the last five years) has 
damaged flora and fauna. The city’s expansion 
evicted more than 2,800 villages, destroying the rural 
economy and impoverishing the rural population. 
Further, in 1985, 70 per cent of Karachi’s vegetable/
fruit requirements came from its rural areas. In 2013, 
this was reduced to 10 per cent. To add to all of this, 
60 billion cubic metres of sand and gravel has been 
illegally lifted for construction from the seasonal rivers 
preventing water run-off, thus making recharging of 
the aquifer impossible and depleting the rainwater 
aquifer on which agriculture depends. 
Multan is a typical example of a major city 
surrounded by prime agricultural land. Housing 
schemes have encroached over its once-fabled 
orchards severely damaging the country’s mango 
production. An example of this is a gated society 
called the Buch Villas that have been constructed 
over land that was previously mango orchards. Bund 
Bosan, Royal Orchards, and WAPDA Town Housing 
Scheme, among others, have all been constructed 
over the mango-growing heartlands of Multan. This 
has resulted in entire orchards being uprooted from 
the land – and families from their ancestral trade. 
Multan’s mango orchards are spread over 44,000 
acres. Around 48 large housing schemes have been 
developed on 7,817 acres of land. Of this, 2,043 
acres (26 per cent) was previously orchards. There 
are 460 legal and illegal housing societies in Multan, 
the majority of which have been built over agricultural 
land. An additional orchard area has already been 
marked for sale. The proposed DHA scheme plans to 
build on over 9,000 acres, most of which is currently 
mango orchards. 
The increase in property prices was a factor which 
persuaded many owners of mango orchards to 
sell their land. One acre of land in DHA Phase 1 
previously cost 2–3 million Pakistani rupees, whereas 
it now costs 6–10 million Pakistani rupees (a 200–
300 per cent increase). 
All of this has added to the climate concerns 
mango growers already faced. The resulting lower 
productivity and heavy losses have forced them to 
clearfell their orchards for other substitute incomes. 
As a consequence, the future for the country’s mango 
industry and all its stakeholders is daunting.
Sources: Ahmed (2017); Farhan (2013).
Table 4. Government spending on housing and community amenities 2012–2018
nATionAL BudgeT BiLLionS of RuPeeS PoPuLATion RuPeeS PeR PeRSon
2012–2013 1.855 177 million 10
2017–2018 2.329 207 million 11.5
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housing scheme on which to build a house. There is 
no provision for this with the HBFCL. Meanwhile, the 
housing backlog has increased to more than half of the 
total annual supply. It is against these realities that the 
financial institutions have been analysed below. 
The high cost of urban land at 20,000 Pakistani rupees 
per square metre is unaffordable for the lower strata 
of society. Without free or subsidised government 
land, urban low-cost housing is a complete non-starter. 
The lack of foreclosure laws deters mortgage finance 
provided by the banking industry. Pakistan’s mortgage 
finance to gross domestic product ratio is under 0.25 
per cent, lower than the South Asian average (0.34 per 
cent) (World Bank 2018). The State Bank of Pakistan 
too sets no goals for compulsory housing finance by 
commercial banks as it does for agricultural lending. 
There also exists a skewed focus in the industry: of the 
12 billion Pakistani rupees annually spent on shelter-
building activity in the country, nearly all of it is in the 
private sector and is concentrated on upper-middle-
class and luxury housing schemes as it seems that there 
is no money to be made in developing low-cost housing. 
Inflation has also had an adverse effect on key building 
materials: steel and cement now costs 250–500 per 
cent more than international prices. Therefore, a 450–
500 square foot low-cost housing unit costs twice as 
much as it should (Said 2016). 
HBFCL has been the only consistently successful 
institution over the years. It was originally a federal 
government institution founded in 1952 called the 
House Building Finance Corporation. It has the largest 
portfolio of disbursement and active loans relating to 
housing finance and a strong, dependable relationship 
with formal-sector developers and builders, and its 
staff at every level understand the housing market. 
So far it has financed 456,256 houses through 
disbursing loans worth 47.82 billion Pakistani rupees 
(US$0.53 billion). Most formal housing projects and 
initiatives automatically include a loan facility from the 
HBFCL (ibid). 
The World Bank recently approved a US$145 
million loan in order to expand access to home-
ownership to women and the poor by providing them 
with affordable housing finance. This loan has been 
approved under the Pakistan Housing Finance Project 
(PHFP) which is being financed by the International 
Development Association with a maturity of 25 years 
and a grace period of five years. It aims to extend 
financial and technical assistance to the Pakistan 
Mortgage Refinancing Company (PMRC), the Planning 
Commission and other institutions. This is of extreme 
importance as nearly a third of the country’s population 
does not own a home and the pressure rises due 
to growing demand. The project incentivises the 
building of green and energy-efficient homes using 
climate and disaster-resilient construction designs and 
materials (World Bank 2018). Apart from the issues 
mentioned previously, the recommendation to regularise 
and improve katchi abadis is still a very important 
government programme for which finances are made 
available. Upgrading consists of providing water, 
sanitation, drainage and road paving and supporting 
community and NGO initiatives for health and education 
by providing them with land and grants. 
2.2 Migration and Karachi
According to the 1998 census, 10 million or 8 per cent 
of Pakistanis were migrants; 25 per cent had gone to 
Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi and 13 per cent to 
Karachi alone. Of total migrants, 63.7 per cent migrated 
to the urban areas, while 46 per cent of migrants were 
women and children who migrated with the family head 
(Government of Pakistan 2017). 
In 1981, Karachi’s migrant population was 1.7 million 
or 33 per cent of the total. In 1998, it has increased 
to 2.2 million or 22 per cent of the total population. In 
addition to this, Karachi has, according to newspaper 
reports, about half of the total ‘aliens’ in Pakistan. 
This means an additional 2 million persons including 
Afghans, Bangladeshis and the Burmese. The Afghans 
are considered refugees by the United Nations but 
the Burmese and Bangladeshis are not. Since they 
are not Pakistani citizens they are not entitled to vote. 
Consequently, their settlements are neglected and have 
very little social or physical infrastructure except what 
philanthropists and NGOs can provide (Raza 2018). 
Karachi’s population at the time of partition (in 1947) 
was approximately 450,000 people (Government of 
Pakistan 2017). On the basis of the 2011 house count, 
it has been estimated that the population has now 
increased to 22 million people (Cox 2012). This is, 
however, contested for various reasons. 
The increase in population described above makes 
Karachi the fastest-growing city in the world. In 
numerical terms, no other city in the history of the world 
has grown that fast. This increase is predominantly due 
to internal migration and migration from India at the 
time of partition. There has also been conflict-related 
migration from Bangladesh and subsequently from other 
places such as Burma, Afghanistan and Iran. This has 
been added to by a large and undocumented increase 
in migrants from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa following conflict 
and natural disasters (earthquakes, floods and drought) 
since 2005. 
As a result of the migration to Karachi, the housing 
demand has significantly increased. This recently 
created demand has not been met officially and so 62 
per cent of the households in Karachi live in informally 
created settlements which have changed over time. 
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Earlier, from 1951 to the 1980s, migration occurred to 
Karachi from stable societies which had functioning 
community systems of governance in place. These 
migrants made a conscious decision to migrate in order 
to improve livelihoods and support families back home. 
Initially, they came and lived with family elders who had 
migrated before them. Today, migrants to Karachi come 
from societies where community systems of governance 
have collapsed or have lost their moral authority, 
making community cohesion difficult and creating 
a push factor. These villages are entirely dependent 
on urban-produced goods which they cannot afford 
and so migration becomes the only viable option. The 
collapse of the caste-profession-barter relationship and 
the community governance system has resulted in the 
collapse of village self-sufficiency and feudal authority. 
This is coupled with a decline in resource and land 
per capita because of an unsustainable increase in 
population. As a result, Karachi is being inundated by 
young men and women who come to seek a better life in 
the city. 
2.3 Land and densification 
Ownership of land all over Pakistan is highly contested. 
Previously, development took place on the immediate 
periphery of the city. Due to the increasing middle-
class demand, the immediate periphery almost all over 
Pakistan is being held for speculation and development. 
Informal development is now almost always beyond this 
land. This makes living for low-income groups difficult 
because of the cost and time involved in commuting 
using substandard transport and due to the degraded 
environmental conditions from the settlement to the 
work area and back. As a result, hypertension, mental 
stress and cardiac disease are common (Urban 
Resource Centre et al. 2016). Also, physical and social 
infrastructure is absent in these distant settlements 
and women have no access to jobs. As a result, it has 
become cheaper and more convenient to live within 
the city on rent rather than own a home beyond the 
periphery. This is leading to the densification of both 
formal and informal inner-city low-income settlements 
and city centres abandoned by the rich (see Box 7).
Box 7. denSificATion: The cASe of kARAchi
The housing demand in Karachi is 120,000 units 
per year of which the formal sector supplies 42,000 
units and the informal sector (katchi abadis) supplies 
32,000 units (approximate figures). The rest of the 
demand is accommodated through the densification 
of existing homes. 
Between 2005 and 2020, 1.7 million households will 
be added to Karachi at an estimated 100,000 units 
per year. Servicing this demand is not possible with 
the current resources and policies of the government 
and so informal settlements (katchi abadis) will 
continue to grow and/or densify. 
There also exists a location issue with the emerging 
informal settlements. In the past, the city was 
small, land was cheap, there was no middle-class 
demand and the city periphery was near the city 
workplaces. Today, the city periphery where cheap 
land is available/exists has been pushed well beyond 
the city’s workplaces by middle-income housing 
schemes and elite gated communities. Commuting 
to and from work from these distant settlements 
involves unaffordable costs and time. This creates a 
demand for housing within the inner-city low-income 
settlements which is being met by the formal and 
informal market leading to very high densities of 
between 1,200 to 3,000 persons per hectare. 
The densification of existing katchi abadis is done by 
changing one- or two-storey informally built homes 
into multi-storey buildings in three ways: house 
owners build upwards either to accommodate an 
expanding family or to create rentals for additional 
income, or, in an increasing number of cases, informal 
developers purchase land from house owners by 
paying them in cash plus adding two apartments to 
the top floor. 
This densification leads to smaller and smaller units 
being created in order to make them affordable 
(6–10 people occupying a single room). There are no 
lifts and this adversely affects women, children and 
elderly people. Further, no Sindh Building Control 
Authority (SBCA) rules and regulations are followed 
in the construction process. Women claim that this 
densification has led to children staying away from 
home, forming gangs and taking drugs. The most 
serious repercussion of this change is that women 
and children lose the use of the street as a public 
space. In the absence of cross ventilation and 
insulation the buildings also become heat islands, 
causing a large number of deaths (see Box 8). 
Source: Hasan (2015). 
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The current crisis has led to a ‘houses versus 
apartments’ debate in Karachi which is also applicable 
to the whole country. It is understood that people 
invariably prefer houses to apartments and would like 
their settlements to be upgraded. This was acceptable 
to the state until the early 2000s. The government 
today, on the other hand, wishes to bulldoze these 
settlements and create medium-rise apartment blocks 
by providing land to developers. The reasoning provided 
for this by the government is that apartments can allow 
higher densities and they give the city a ‘modern look’. 
Research, however, shows that individual houses 
can provide higher densities than permitted by the 
Karachi building bylaws and zoning regulations (1,625 
persons per hectare) (Hasan et al. 2010). Continued 
densification has increased densities in Karachi’s inner-
city settlements from 450 persons per hectare in 1973 
to over 3,000 persons per hectare in 2010. Persons per 
room in the case of government-provided labour housing 
in the form of apartments has increased from 5.8 in 
1976 to 10 in 2010 (Hasan et al. 2010).
The nature of development has also resulted in skewed 
residential land use in Karachi as in the rest of urban 
Pakistan. Informal settlements currently accommodate 
62 per cent (about 13 million) of Karachi’s population 
on 23 per cent of the city’s residential lands with 
continuously increasing densities of 1,500–4,500 
persons per ha. In contrast, 36 per cent (about 7.5 
million) of Karachi’s citizens live in planned settlements 
on 77 per cent of the city’s residential lands where 
continuously decreasing densities (with the creation 
of new planned settlements) can be as low as 80 
persons per ha.6 It is acknowledged that this manner of 
development is not sustainable given rapid urbanisation 
in Pakistan. 
2.4 New laws and their 
repercussions 
A number of new laws have been formulated in Pakistan 
in support of private developers. Those that will have a 
long-term effect have been implemented in the Sindh 
province. A brief description of these laws and their 
repercussions is given below. 
The Sindh High Density Board Act 2014 has created 
a board of nine persons, all government officials and 
politicians. This board can declare any road, plot or 
area as high density and increase its floor-to-area ratio 
to 1:12. No urban design exercise has been done to 
determine which areas should be declared as high 
density. As a result, through official patronage, high-rise 
buildings are developing all over Karachi. Most of them 
consist of between 15 to 40 storeys. These are putting 
a heavy burden on the existing infrastructure and adding 
to the number of vehicles on already-congested streets. 
They are also creating approximately 200,000 plus 
apartments. Apartment living is creating a new urban 
culture by increasing nuclear families and breaking 
Box 8. The 2015 kARAchi heATWAve And cLimATe chAnge
More than 1,200 deaths and 40,000 cases of 
people suffering from heatstroke and heat exhaustion 
were officially reported in 2015 during the Karachi 
heatwave. Power outages also led to water shortages 
especially during the fasting hours of the holy month 
of Ramadan making it much more difficult to bear 
the heat. 
Karachi in the past has experienced far higher 
temperatures than it did during the heatwave of 2015. 
However, deaths and people suffering from heatstroke 
were not reported. The reason for this is related to 
the creation of what is known as the urban heat island 
effect. Karachi, during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s 
was by and large a low-density and low-rise city. 
Today, it is a high-density high-rise concrete jungle. 
To maximise on profits and space, new housing does 
not have cross ventilation, which is a requirement in 
a city that is humid and receives a sea breeze for 9 
months of the year. The streets in the informal high-
rise settlements are narrow. There are thousands 
of kilometres of black tarmac roads and insufficient 
green cover. The external walls of buildings and 
homes are not insulated and nor are the roofs. Air 
conditioning is common to most commercial buildings 
and elite and middle-class homes. This is why most 
victims of the heatwave came from inner-city low-
income areas. 
To tackle the heat island effect, it is essential to 
research and develop cheap materials that can be 
used for insulating external walls and roofs, and 
introducing them to contractors and builders in low-
income settlements. This could easily be a programme 
for an NGO working in Karachi’s katchi abadis. 
Sources: Ebrahim (2015) and lead author’s observations.
6 Calculated by the authors based on the Karachi Strategic Development Plan 2020 (City District Government Karachi 2007).
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communities and old neighbourhoods. Social and 
hence planning repercussions need to be understood 
and catered for.
The Sindh Special Development Board Act 2014 
provides for the government identifying katchi abadis, 
demolishing them and rehabilitating their residents in 
medium- to high-rise apartments, thus making more 
than half the land vacant. This land is to be handed 
over to the developers free of cost to develop whatever 
they wish. However, they have to bear the cost of 
rehabilitating the katchi abadi residents in apartments. 
They are also to provide schools, health centres and run 
them for a period of 10 years. So far, no scheme has 
been implemented under this act because of the state’s 
fear of retaliation from katchi abadi residents. 
If these two acts are implemented, they will promote 
individualism and make community organisation and 
action difficult. The three most internationally recognised 
housing-related projects that support poor communities 
are located in Pakistan (see Box 9). There has been 
constant pressure on the government to integrate the 
planning principles of these projects into official policy. 
The two acts are a negation of these principles. 
Under the Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act 
1994, there are two committees: a technical committee 
that identifies heritage buildings, lists and details them, 
and negotiates with the owners. It sends its proposals 
to an advisory committee of which the chief secretary 
of the province is the chairperson. The advisory 
committee directs the Sindh government to notify the 
buildings. Over 2,000 buildings and sites have been 
identified in the province. However, there is a constant 
conflict between the committees and the developers 
who are often backed by the politicians. Much of the 
heritage properties are in the old cities and in the case 
of Karachi their residents are low-income communities 
who resist the conservation attempts. More recently, 
Box 9. ThRee innovATive communiTY PRojecTS
The best internationally known project in Pakistan is 
the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) in Karachi. Through 
its various programmes, over 3 million people have 
built and financed their own underground sanitation 
systems at the neighbourhood level while the state 
has supported the building of trunks and disposal 
points. Over 16,000 houses have benefitted from 
the house improvement programme which supports 
contractors in improving their choice of building 
materials and components; masons in upgrading 
their skills; and supports rural settlements in 
documentation so as to help them to convert into 
urban neighbourhoods.
The Khuda ki Basti (‘God’s settlement’) are 
incremental housing schemes in Hyderabad and 
Karachi, where homeless people are given land 
against a small down payment and affordable 
A shop in Khuda ki Basti, a low-income settlement in Karachi © 
Fareena Chanda
monthly instalments. They build their own 
neighbourhood water and sanitation systems while 
the administration of the settlement invites NGOs to 
develop social infrastructure such as schools and 
clinics, helps in arranging transport routes through 
negotiations with the transport department of the 
government, and provides advice to the community on 
building water and sanitation systems.
The Urban Resource Centre (URC) monitors 
government policies that affect the poor and the 
environment in Karachi. They provide this information 
to community leaders, media and civil society. They 
invite government officials to make presentations 
of their plans to community leaders and the media. 
They also document the discussions that take place. 
Through this process the interests of low-income 
communities are safeguarded – especially in case 
of evictions.
All three projects have had a major impact on the 
thinking of government and international agencies, 
academia and the media. However, with the 
emergence of neoliberal thinking and policies, private-
sector developments are increasingly supported 
by the government and as such these innovative 
community projects are given less importance 
than previously. What will be the future of these 
programmes with an apartment culture dominating 
the city? Will it increase the rich-poor divide and limit 
these institutions to the urban fringe?
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the government has taken an US$80 million loan for 
neighbourhood improvement projects for Karachi. As 
a result, a process of gentrification has begun in the 
city centre which is resulting in the feared eviction of 
hundreds of businesses which can have an adverse 
effect on the housing situation if the owners of the 
evicted businesses are living in rented accommodation.
2.5 Rental laws and 
evictions
Rental laws in Pakistan are very pro-tenant. As a result, 
formal developers and individuals are not willing to 
invest in rentals. However, an informal rental market 
in low-income settlements is growing rapidly due to 
difficulty in acquiring land and because of the increasing 
cost of construction as evident in Table 5 for Karachi 
below. And in low-income settlements, rental laws do 
not apply. Much of the control is done using coercion – 
muscle power – of which the poorer of the poor are the 
main victims. 
Major infrastructure projects are being built in Pakistan 
and as a result, fairly large-scale evictions have taken 
place. The land is acquired under the Land Acquisition 
Act of 1884 which gives the government the right to 
acquire any land for public good. The legal landowners 
are compensated under this law but not persons who 
have no legal ownership or renters. The largest eviction 
in Pakistan took place in Karachi whereby about 35,000 
homes and businesses were demolished to make way 
for the Lyari Expressway. The evictees were rehabilitated 
far away from their original homes which were near their 
places of work. Studies have shown that they became 
much poorer as a result and the worst affected were 
women and children (Ghaus et al. 2012; Hasan 2006b). 
There was very strong resistance to these evictions 
which was supported by civil society organisations. 
As a result, it has become difficult for the provincial 
government to take a firm decision on evictions and in 
some cases, they have opted to pay the evictees the 
market price of the land they occupy. The same decision 
has been taken by the Punjab government in the 
construction of its Orange Line Metro, although earlier 
they had carried out evictions for the building of the 
Lahore Ring Road.
The rehabilitation of the Karachi Circular Railway 
involves the relocation of 5,000 households. The 
Karachi Circular Railway Affectees Welfare Association 
has suggested that instead of relocation they should be 
compensated in cash for the demolition of their homes. 
This would increase the project cost by 0.4 per cent 
but it would not entail a whole new relocation project in 
an inappropriate site as usually happens in government 
projects (Hasan 2017). There is also considerable 
opposition in society to the Land Acquisition Act and 
it is possible that changes will be made to it if the 
opposition continues and increases.
Table 5. Karachi: increases in housing costs 1991–2007
COst PeR sqUaRe MetRe
1991 2007
Land in new peri-urban katchi 
abadis 
Rs 176 (US$2.35) or 1.7 times the 
daily wage for unskilled labour
Rs 2,500 (US$33.33) or 10 times 
the daily wage for unskilled labour
Construction cost of semi-
permanent house in katchi abadis 
Rs 660 (US$8.8) Rs 5,000 (US$66.66)
RenTALS
Rent for a semi-permanent house in 
katchi abadis 
Rs 350 (US$4.66) or 2.5 times the 
daily wage for unskilled labour
Rs 2,500 (US$33.33) or 10 times 
the daily wage for unskilled labour
Source: Hasan (2008).
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3 
The institutional 
framework and reform
The 1978 Local Bodies Ordinance operated 
throughout the country until 1981. Under it, there 
were municipal councils who were subservient to the 
provincial bureaucracy. In the larger cities, there were 
development authorities which were also subservient to 
the provincial housing departments. However, in 2001, a 
major local bodies reform was enacted under which the 
magisterial powers of the bureaucracy were withdrawn. 
Power was passed on to elected local councils and their 
indirectly elected mayors at the district, tehsil (sub-
district), and union council levels. This was carried out 
during a military-led government. 
When the politicians came back to power in 2008, they 
scrapped the 2001 local bodies act and reverted back 
to the old system, centralising power at the provincial 
level. This happened in all the provinces to a lesser or 
greater extent. In addition, all provincial governments 
are increasingly transferring the provision of utilities and 
services to private companies or to build, operate and 
transfer systems and private-public partnerships. There 
is considerable agitation against this from workers’ 
unions whose demands on this subject are not being 
met. Karachi’s case is special for reasons described in 
Box 10. 
3.1 House Building Finance 
Company Limited
For the HBFCL to fulfil its mandate of providing homes 
to the poorer sections of the country it is necessary to 
increase its finances which can be done by the floating 
of bonds and slashing low-cost housing building costs 
by having HBFCL schemes for the poor exempt from 
tariffs, regulatory duties and surcharges for importing 
building materials that are used in its self-constructed 
housing units. In addition, free land grants would 
also help it meet its objectives more effectively. The 
result of these suggestions could escalate HBFCL’s 
target to 50,000 units built per year by 2025. This 
would allow the HBFCL to cater for at least 25 per 
cent of the country’s incremental demand for low-cost 
housing units, without any monetary handout from the 
Government of Pakistan (Said 2016).
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3.2 Land reforms
There has to be a method for containing speculation and 
making land available to the poorer sections of society. 
For this, it is important that all government land which 
is vacant within urban areas should be reserved for 
low-cost low-income housing projects. Laws should be 
enacted whereby the state as a priority can acquire such 
land. In addition, urban land reform should be carried 
out. The components of the reform should include a 
heavy non-utilisation fee on vacant land and property; 
an urban land ceiling act under which no one individual 
can own more than 500 square meters of urban land; 
no settlement (whether for the poor or for the rich) 
should have a density of fewer than 420 persons per 
hectare; no person should be provided a second loan 
for the purchase of a home; and the existing laws such 
as the High Density Board Act (2014) should be made 
subservient to an urban design plan. 
3.3 Reforms to institutional 
arrangements
What we have learnt in Pakistan is that public 
participation in the development of human settlements is 
essential as it ensures transparency and accountability. 
We suggest that institutions such as the Sindh Building 
Control Authority, the Malir Development Authority 
(MDA), the Lyari Development Authority (LDA), and 
the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KWSB) 
should have civil society members on their boards 
who should also be responsible for the financial health 
of the institution, that all development plans should 
be displayed in public places where they are to be 
implemented, and that citizens’ views on them should be 
solicited. Every project should be headed by an officer 
from its initiation until its end and the officer’s name 
should appear on the letterhead and all advertisements 
related to the project.
Box 10. kARAchi: inSTiTuTionAL iSSueS
Karachi is the non-Sindhi speaking capital of a Sindhi-
speaking province. The city contains 62 per cent of 
Sindh’s urban population and 30 per cent of its total 
population. Karachi’s large-scale industrial sector 
employs 71.6 per cent of the total industrial labour 
force in Sindh. The city produces 74.8 per cent of 
the province’s total industrial output and contains 78 
per cent of its formal private-sector jobs. In the 1998 
census, 48.52 per cent of Karachi’s population spoke 
Urdu as the mother tongue and only 14 per cent of 
residents spoke Sindhi and other local languages. 
In addition, Karachi is Pakistan’s economic hub 
and contains the province’s best education and 
health institutions. It is also the centre of Pakistan’s 
media industry. 
Karachi’s enormous wealth can only be controlled 
by the Sindhi-speaking population through 
centralisation and by the Urdu-speaking inhabitants 
of the city by decentralisation. Since the Sindhi-
speaking population controls the majority in the 
provincial assembly, they have embarked upon a 
process of large-scale centralisation through the 
establishment of companies under provincial control. 
Electricity, solid waste management, infrastructure 
development, health and education are now provided 
by the private sector or increasingly through public-
private partnerships controlled by the province 
whose bureaucrats, especially the new recruits, are 
increasingly Sindhi speaking. 
Apart from the politics of ethnicity, Karachi has other 
problems. Since the Afghan war began in 1980, 
Karachi has been involved in it. American arms and 
ammunition to Afghanistan have flowed through 
Karachi. The Afghan transit trade has been managed 
through Karachi and during the second Afghan war, 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops 
were supplied from Karachi. Due to this, the Taliban 
and the Afghan militias developed proxies in the 
city. As a result, until recently the city was subjected 
to targeted killings of its progressive citizens and 
continuous bomb blasts. In this way, the Afghans have 
also become a part of Karachi’s political mix and have 
major financial interests in the city.
Sources: City District Government Karachi (2007) and 
Government of Pakistan (2017). 
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4 
What does the future 
hold for Pakistan’s 
cities?
From the previous sections, it is obvious that there is 
an urban housing crisis in Pakistan where there is a 
backlog of 8.5 million new houses required, against 
a requirement of 350,000 per year. However, the 
number of homes which the formal sector supply is only 
150,000. To freeze the current situation would require 
100 billion Pakistani rupees annually (approximately 
US$825.3 million) for the coming 10 years. Yet last 
year’s budget allocation for housing was only 2.329 
billion Pakistani rupees (approximately US$192 million). 
In addition to what has been discussed in the paper, 
a number of policy directions for the future can 
be extracted. 
4.1 Legislate for land 
acquisition
For the last 15 years, the de-facto housing policy in 
Pakistan has been about individual families accessing 
the market and the state liberalising credit facilities for 
it. However, the low-income groups that constitute the 
majority of the population cannot access these credit 
facilities because accessing them requires collateral, or 
a formal-sector job, which most do not have. In addition, 
there are no loans available for the purchase of land. 
However, the new government has promised to provide 
5 million homes in the next five years. The major problem 
in providing these homes is the availability of land at 
appropriate places, in the absence of which, housing 
may not be occupied as has happened so often in the 
past. To make such land available, the government will 
have to pass a law through which it can acquire land for 
low-income housing.
4.2 Regularise informal 
housing
Katchi abadis and ISALs through which low-income 
families have traditionally acquired land for housing have 
become expensive. Also, cheap land for them is now 
only available on the fringe of expanded cities, far away 
from where they work and social amenities. This has 
made renting in katchi abadis nearer to the city cheaper 
than owning a home in the periphery. 
The informal market has responded to this by densifying 
the inner-city katchi abadis by building upwards while 
continuing to create new settlements on the periphery. 
As such it has become the largest supplier of land, 
built housing and credit. Meanwhile, families are also 
adding to their homes or subdividing them into smaller 
units. The high rises that are emerging suffer from all 
the problems of severe overcrowding and the transition 
from single- and double-story homes to high-rise 
apartments has resulted in the loss of narrow streets as 
public space for women and children. This densification 
is going to continue in the absence of large-scale 
social housing. 
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Given this, it is necessary to launch a new regularisation 
programme for densified katchi abadis. This will be very 
different from the earlier programme because it would 
involve dealing with apartments and renters, and not 
just homes and individual families. Such a programme 
would include technical advice and guidance to informal 
developers, families, and/or communities in producing 
better designs and in the process a better social and 
physical environment. We suggest that an NGO such 
as the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) or an academic 
institution initiate such a project, document the process, 
and establish a training centre for NGOs and relevant 
government agencies.
4.3 Set appropriate housing 
standards
The formal-sector developers have now started to cater 
to the needs of the lower middle-income groups and 
have also shown an interest in serving the lower-income 
groups. However, what they have produced so far is of 
poor quality and their product is becoming smaller and 
smaller so that it can be affordable to their prospective 
clients. The neighbourhoods they are creating are 
environmentally of a poorer quality than the katchi 
abadis where the poor live today. It is necessary to set 
appropriate standards for housing and develop the 
necessary legal and monetary processes to implement 
them. A reduction or removal on duties of building 
materials for such housing would considerably lower 
their costs.
The high-rise katchi abadis (5–10 storeys) are creating 
a heat island effect because of rising climate change-
related temperatures. This is especially true for Karachi 
where there have been a number of deaths as a result 
of the heat island effect. For the existing katchi abadis 
there needs to be a programme of creating ventilation 
in homes and apartments and painting the exterior walls 
and roof with heat-reflective paints. It is also necessary 
to provide materials with high insulation values for the 
external walls. The paints and materials available today, 
and manufactured by corporate-sector industries, are 
far too expensive for lower-income and lower middle-
income groups to afford. It is necessary to initiate a 
research programme for developing cheaper options 
and an extension programme for making the products 
available to prospective home owners, contractors 
and builders in low-income settlements. Such a 
programme could be a part of the NGO pilot project 
suggested above.
4.4 Suppress land 
speculation
Real estate development in Pakistan is highly 
speculative. This skews the housing market in favour of 
those who have money to invest and hold. This creates 
unnaturally high land and property prices, which works 
against the interests of lower-income groups. 
Legislation is required to contain speculation. Such 
legislation can be in the form of a non-utilisation fee on 
vacant land and properties, and an urban land ceiling 
act which limits land holding to no more than 500 
square metres per person. Given the fact that most 
legislators in Pakistan are involved in speculation, this 
might be difficult to enact.
Low-density housing (often only 80 persons per 
hectare) for the middle-classes and the rich is eating 
away at available land for low-income groups. In 
addition, it is also occupying land on the urban fringe 
through the creation of gated communities. As a result, 
forests, orchards, rich agricultural lands and drainage 
systems are being occupied, creating the beginnings 
of a massive ecological disaster. To contain this, it is 
necessary that for all future development, a minimum 
density of around 400 persons per hectare should 
be enacted. Also, civil society groups should support 
indigenous movements against the occupation of their 
land (often through coercion) by developers so that the 
courts of law (who are already cognisant of this) could 
pursue this issue seriously. 
4.5 Establish criteria for 
new housing projects
Increasingly, planning has been replaced by projects 
and many of these projects take away space from 
low-income groups through a process of gentrification. 
Given the nature of financing development, projects 
will continue to dominate over plans for the foreseeable 
future. There has to be a set of criteria for judging the 
merit of development projects. What we have proposed 
in the report is that projects should not damage 
the ecology of the region in which they are located; 
should determine land use on the basis of sociological 
and environmental considerations and not on land 
value alone; serve the interests of the majority of the 
population who are lower-income and lower middle-
income groups; and respect the tangible and intangible 
cultural heritage of the communities that live in the city.
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4.6 Support housing 
research
Academic institutions give great importance to housing-
related community projects. This is how it should be. 
However, given the importance of the role of informal 
capitalism in the provision of housing it is important 
that academic institutions should understand the 
processes and actors involved in delivering this form 
of development, especially the financial mechanisms. 
Research leading to an understanding of the processes 
will help create professionals who can deal with this 
phenomenon and support and guide it in the future.
4.7 Provide affordable 
credit
However, the most important issue is related to the 
availability of credit for house building and improvement 
and the terms associated with it. An issue that has been 
debated often is whether a house improvement loan 
can be provided to a resident living in a katchi abadi 
or whether a house building loan can be provided to 
him/her using his/her informally developed home as 
collateral. Decisions in favour of these proposals have 
been successfully opposed by bankers. In addition, 
the HBFCL (the premier housing bank in Pakistan) 
has very limited funds. To overcome this, it will have 
to develop innovative ways (such as floating housing 
bonds) for increasing its credit facilities. Also, to reduce 
costs and improve designs, it should create a design 
department which produces standardised designs for 
homes and apartments which can guide developers and 
individual families. 
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Pakistan is experiencing an unprecedented urban housing crisis.  
Low-rise, low-income urban settlements are rapidly and informally 
becoming high-rise, high-density informal settlements, with all the 
physical, social and environmental problems of unplanned densification. 
Meanwhile, speculative low-density elite housing is encroaching on the 
ecological assets of the city. This working paper explores the factors 
that have led to this crisis – and also what policy actions can be taken 
to help mitigate it, such as passing legislation to acquire land for low-
income settlements, suppressing land speculation and prescribing 
minimum density for all settlements. Providing affordable credit and house 
improvement loans for informal settlements will also be crucial, as well 
as advice on how to use those loans effectively. Appropriate housing 
standards are also needed so that design and technical advice is available 
to those involved in the informal and formal densification process, while 
also establishing criteria for judging the merits of new housing projects. 
Finally, more research is needed to better understand the processes, 
actors and dynamics of the evolving informal densification process.
